Social preferences on networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rezaei, Sarah; Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz; Westbrock, Bastian
• 署名单位: Utrecht University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Radboud University Nijmegen; University of Hamburg
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105113
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: social preferences; Network games; public goods

摘要

Social preferences are a powerful determinant of human behavior. We study their behavioral implications within the context of a network game. A key feature of our game is the existence of multiple equilibria that widely differ in terms of their payoff distributions. Determining which equilibrium is most plausible is thus a key concern. We show that introducing social preferences into the game can resolve the problem of equilibrium multiplicity. However, the selected equilibria do not necessarily yield more efficient or egalitarian payoff distributions. Rather, they just reinforce the inequality that is already inherent in a network structure. We validate these predictions in an experiment and discuss their implications for managerial practice and behavior in larger networks.