No-claim refunds and healthcare use

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Avdic, Daniel; Decker, Simon; Karlsson, Martin; Salm, Martin
• 署名单位: Deakin University; Leibniz Association; RWI - Leibniz Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; University of Duisburg Essen; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.105061
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: No-claim refund; moral hazard; health insurance

摘要

No -claim refunds are cost -control instruments which stipulate a payback agreement contingent on one or more claim -free years. We study how such no -claim refunds affect claiming behavior using claims data from a large German health insurer and a policy that increased the refund size for certain plans. We propose a method to decompose the effect on claims into behavioral and non -behavioral components, and show that individuals responded to the refund policy by reducing claims by eight percent on average. The effect persisted for several years; behavioral responses were stronger for clients with more to gain from the policy; and reductions in claims were not restricted to treatments of questionable medical value.