Medical bill shock and imperfect moral hazard

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, David M.; Hoagland, Alex; Zhu, Ed
• 署名单位: Duke University; University of Toronto; Boston University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105152
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Ex-post moral hazard; Price transparency; learning; Low-value care

摘要

Consumers are sensitive to medical prices when consuming care, but delays in price information may distort moral hazard. We study how medical bills affect household spillover spending following utilization of shoppable services, leveraging variation in insurer claim processing times. Households increase spending by 22% after a scheduled service, but then reduce spending by 11% after the bill arrives. Observed bill effects are consistent with resolving price uncertainty; bill effects are strongest when pricing information is particularly salient. A model of demand for healthcare with delayed pricing information suggests households misperceive pricing signals prior to bills, and that correcting these perceptions reduce average (median) spending by 16% (7%) annually.