Powers that be? Political alignment, government formation, and government stability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carozzi, Felipe; Cipullo, Davide; Repetto, Luca
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; Uppsala University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.105017
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Government stability; Government formation; Political alignment; Inter-governmental relations

摘要

We study how partisan alignment across levels of government affects coalition formation and government stability using a regression discontinuity design and a large dataset of Spanish municipal elections. We document a positive effect of alignment on both government formation and stability. Alignment increases the probability that the most-voted party appoints the mayor and decreases the probability that the government is unseated during the term. Aligned parties also obtain sizeable electoral gains in the next elections. We show that these findings are not the consequence of favoritism in the allocation of transfers towards aligned governments.