Inside the West Wing: Lobbying as a contest

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Langtry, Alastair
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105068
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Lobbying; contests; Special interest politics

摘要

When a government makes many different policy decisions, lobbying can be viewed as a contest between the government and many different special interest groups. The government fights lobbying by interest groups with its own political capital. In this world, we find that a government wants to 'sell protection' - give favourable treatment in exchange for contributions - to certain interest groups. It does this in order to build its own 'war chest' of political capital, which improves its position in fights with other interest groups. And it does so until it wins all remaining contests with certainty. This stands in contrast to existing models that often view lobbying as driven by information or agency problems.