Optimal default options

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bernheim, B. Douglas; Mueller-Gastell, Jonas
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105203
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Default effects; Optimal defaults; Personal saving; Pension policy; Behavioral public economics

摘要

Previous studies of optimal default options demonstrate that either opt-out minimization or maximization is optimal under restrictive conditions. We obtain a general characterization of the solution by studying optimal defaults when one of the problem's parameters approaches a limiting value. We interpret these asymptotic optima as approximate optima for non-limiting cases and justify this interpretation through numerical simulations. When the designer and choosers agree about the activity's value, simple forms of weighted opt-out minimization are asymptotically optimal. Additional results encompass Pigouvian fees, normative ambiguity, and cases in which the designer and choosers disagree about the activity's value.