Can changes in disability insurance work incentives influence beneficiary employment? Evidence from the promoting opportunity demonstration
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Levere, Michael; Wittenburg, David; Jones, John T.
署名单位：
Westat
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105370
发表日期：
2025
关键词：
摘要：
We study how disability beneficiary work behavior responds to a rule change that replaces a cash cliff-a threshold above which benefits reduce to zero-with a benefit offset ramp-where benefits are gradually phased out. Using a randomized controlled trial with over 10,000 Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries who voluntarily enrolled in the demonstration, we find precisely estimated null effects on earnings, income, and benefit amounts. An analysis of mechanisms indicates that administrative burden, the limited size of the incentive, and individual and systemic barriers to employment for people with disabilities likely contributed to the limited impacts.
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