Learning the hard way: Conflicts, sanctions and military aid☆

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grillo, Edoardo; Nicolo, Antonio
• 署名单位: University of Padua; University of Manchester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105310
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: CONFLICT; SANCTIONS; Military aid; information design; Third-party intervention

摘要

Countries involved in conflicts learn about their military strength from the battlefield. We study how a third party intervenes to manipulate this learning. An attacker and a defender engage in a conflict whose outcome conveys information about the attacker's strength. A third party worries that the attacker becomes more confident about its military strength and can intervene to help the defender. This intervention is risky: if the attacker wins despite the help the defender receives, its confidence increases even further. We show that optimal third-party intervention is non-monotonic in the attacker's strength. We also show that a high level of patriotism and resolve to defend itself improve the defender's odds in the conflict by inducing third-party intervention.