Nothing for something: Marketing cancer drugs to physicians increases prescribing without improving mortality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carey, Colleen; Daly, Michael; Li, Jing
• 署名单位: Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Washington
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105311
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Analysis of health care markets; Information and product quality; search; learning

摘要

Physicians commonly receive marketing-related transfers from drug firms. We examine the impact of these relationships on the prescribing of physician-administered cancer drugs in Medicare. We find that prescribing of the associated drug increases 4% in the twelve months after a payment is received, with the increase beginning sharply in the month of payment and fading out within a year. A marketing payment also leads physicians to begin treating cancer patients with lower predicted mortality. While payments result in greater expenditure on cancer drugs, there are no associated improvements inpatient mortality.