Frames, incentives, and education: Effectiveness of interventions to delay public pension claiming

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Glenzer, Franca; Michaud, Pierre-Carl; Staubli, Stefan
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Calgary
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105419
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Pension claiming; Annuities; retirement; Financial education; framing

摘要

In many retirement income systems, people forgo a higher stream of public pension income by claiming early. This paper provides survey-and quasi-experimental evidence on how increasing financial incentives, educating individuals, and changing the framing of the claiming decision affect pension claiming and the present value of expected pension benefits. We find that all three types of interventions induce delays, but they have heterogeneous financial consequences. Educating participants about the claiming decision and life expectancy leads to claiming ages with higher pension wealth. In contrast, changing the framing of the claiming decision and strengthening financial incentives do not improve, and may even worsen, financial outcomes.