Assessing social costs of inefficient procurement design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eklöf, M
• 署名单位: Uppsala University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1162/1542476054430825
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 826-850
• 关键词: Auctions; COMPETITION; collusion

摘要

This paper considers the social costs implied by inefficient allocation of contracts in a first-price, scaled-bid procurement auction with asymmetric bidders. We adopt a constrained (piecewise linear) strategy equilibrium concept and estimate the structural parameters of the bidders' distribution of costs. We estimate social costs defined as the predicted cost difference between the winning firm and the most efficient bidding firm. We also compare the expected procurement costs under two different auction formats. The data is collected from procurement auctions of road painting in Sweden during 1993-1999. The results indicate that the social costs of inefficient contract allocation is about 2% of total potential production cost and that an efficient second-price auction would lower the expected procurement cost by 2.5%.