LEGAL STANDARDS, ENFORCEMENT, AND CORRUPTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Immordino, Giovanni; Pagano, Marco
• 署名单位: University of Salerno; University of Naples Federico II
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1104-1132
• 关键词: LAW

摘要

Stricter laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement. Because enforcement activity depends both on available tax revenue and the honesty of officials, the optimal legal standard of a benevolent government is increasing in per capita income and decreasing in officials' corruption. In contrast to the tollbooth view of regulation, the standard chosen by a self-interested government is a non-monotonic function of officials' corruption, and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a benevolent regulator. International evidence on environmental regulation shows that standards correlate positively with per-capita income, and negatively with corruption, consistent with the model's predictions for benevolent governments. (JEL: D73, K42, L51)