USE AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: A BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bartling, Bjoern; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M.
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12017
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 711-742
• 关键词: reference points; CONTRACTS; COMPETITION; RECIPROCITY; fairness; unemployment; ORGANIZATION; COOPERATION; ECONOMICS; industry

摘要

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951, Econometrica, 19, 293-302), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to the realization of the state of the world, but he may also abuse this flexibility to exploit the agent. We capture this tradeoff in an experimental design and show that principals exhibit a strong preference for the employment contract. However, selfish principals exploit agents in one-shot interactions, inducing the latter to resist entering into employment contracts. American Economic Review, 62, 777-795) critique of the Coasian approach.