CREATIVITY AND INCENTIVES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Charness, Gary; Grieco, Daniela
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvx055
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 454-496
• 关键词: intrinsic motivation; dark side; reward; COMPETITION; generation; schemes; DESIGN; firm; pay

摘要

Creativity is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon with tremendous economic importance. Acrucial question for economists and for firms is the interplay of incentives and creativity. We present experiments where subjects face creativity tasks where, in one case, ex ante goals and constraints are imposed on their answers (closed tasks), and in the other case no restrictions apply (open tasks). The effect of tournament incentives on creativity is then tested. Our experimental findings provide striking evidence that financial incentives in the form of tournament competition affect creativity in closed (constrained) tasks, but do not facilitate creativity in open (unconstrained) tasks, whereas being ranked relative to one's peers is an effective nonmonetary incentive with both types of tasks. We develop a structural model that allows for subjects' heterogeneity in being affected by the openness of the task, and then use the structural model to not only estimate creative output in tournaments but also to predict creative output in two counterfactual incentive schemes: piece rate and target bonus.