FAMILY NETWORKS AND DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fafchamps, Marcel; Labonne, Julien
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvz023
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1697-1725
• 关键词: contagion

摘要

We study the distribution of public services by local politicians when political support spreads through social networks. We sketch a model showing that incumbents target goods and services to individuals who would lead to the largest aggregate loss of support if they stopped supporting the incumbent. Those individuals have high betweenness centrality. Using data on 3.6 million households from the Philippines, we show that households with high betweenness centrality receive a greater number of public services from their local government. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls for program eligibility, detailed measure of family wealth and elite status, family ties with politicians, and other measures of centrality.