REPUTATION WITH OPPORTUNITIES FOR COASTING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bar-Isaac, Heski; Deb, Joyee
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvaa008
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 200-236
• 关键词: Moral hazard

摘要

Reputation concerns can discipline agents and generate good outcomes. But what if outcomes are not always observed? Infrequent observation can strengthen reputation incentives and encourage effort. By exerting effort when outcomes are more likely observed, an agent can improve her reputation and gain by coasting on this reputation by shirking when the audience is less likely to be observing her actions. Opportunities to coast can in fact lead to greater overall effort than constant observation. We consider Markov information structures and characterize the observability structure that maximizes efficient effort.