REPUTATION CONCERNS IN RISKY EXPERIMENTATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing
• 署名单位: Kyoto University; University of Osaka; University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvaa046
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1981-2021
• 关键词: serial entrepreneurship; MARKET

摘要

High-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success in risky experimentation, but learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model with double-crossing property. This property tends to induce homogenization of quitting times between types, which in turn leads to some pooling in equilibrium. Low-ability agents may hold out to continue their project for the prospect of pooling with the high type, despite having a negative instantaneous net payoff. A war-of-attrition mechanism causes low-ability agents to quit only gradually over time, and to stop quitting for a period immediately before all agents exit.