Using Preference Estimates to Customize Incentives: An Application to Polio Vaccination Drives in Pakistan

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andreoni, James; Callen, Michael; Hussain, Karrar; Khan, Muhammad Yasir; Sprenger, Charles
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Erlangen Nuremberg; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvac068
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1428-1477
• 关键词: individual discount rates; time-preferences; self-control; financial incentives; BEHAVIOR; poverty; CHOICE

摘要

We use estimates of time preferences to customize incentives for polio vaccinators in Lahore, Pakistan. We measure time preferences using intertemporal allocations of effort, and use these estimates to construct individually tailored incentives. We evaluate the effect of matching contract terms to discounting parameters in a subsequent experiment with the same vaccinators. Our tailored policy is compared with alternatives that either rely on atheoretic reduced-form relationships for policy guidance or apply the same policy to all individuals. We find that contracts tailored to individual discounting outperform this range of policy alternatives.