Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cahuc, Pierre; Carcillo, Stephane; Patault, Berengere; Moreau, Flavien
• 署名单位: Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD); University of Amsterdam; International Monetary Fund
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvad046
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1319-1366
• 关键词: disability insurance receipt; financing constraints; decision-making; PROTECTION

摘要

This paper documents the existence of judge-specific differences on granting compensation for wrongful dismissal and shows that their consequences are different for small low-performing firms than for other firms. Pro-worker judge bias reduces job creation for all firms, increases the destruction of permanent jobs in small and low-performing firms but reduces it in large high-performing firms. Pro-worker bias reduces employment and survival for small and low-performing firms but has no significant effects on these outcomes for the other firms. The probability that permanent incumbent workers keep their job in firms judged by a pro-worker judge increases in large and high-performing firms, while it decreases in small, poorly performing firms.