Optimal Taxation of Robots

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Thuemmel, Uwe
• 署名单位: University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvac062
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1154-1190
• 关键词: redistributive taxation; wage inequality; tax; GROWTH; polarization; automation; machines

摘要

I study the optimal taxation of robots, other capital, and labor income. I show that it is optimal to distort robot adoption. The robot tax (or subsidy) exploits general-equilibrium effects to compress wages, which reduces income-tax distortions of labor supply, thereby raising welfare. In the calibrated model, when robots are expensive, a robot subsidy is optimal. As robots get cheaper, it becomes optimal to tax them. Yet, when reforming the status-quo tax system, most welfare gains can be achieved by adjusting the income tax. The additional gains from taxing robots differently from other equipment capital are close to zero.