An empirical model of non-equilibrium behavior in games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kline, Brendan
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1759-7323
• DOI: 10.3982/QE647
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 141-181
• 关键词: games; Heterogeneity; identification; non-equilibrium; strategic reasoning

摘要

This paper studies the identification and estimation of the decision rules that individuals use to determine their actions in games, based on a structural econometric model of non-equilibrium behavior in games. The model is based primarily on various notions of limited strategic reasoning, allowing multiple modes of strategic reasoning and heterogeneity in strategic reasoning across individuals and within individuals. The paper proposes the model and provides sufficient conditions for point identification of the model. Then the model is estimated on data from an experiment involving two-player guessing games. The application illustrates the empirical relevance of the main features of the model.