Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung
• 署名单位: Lehigh University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1759-7323
• DOI: 10.3982/QE683
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1453-1487
• 关键词: Neologism-proofness; cheap talk; equilibrium refinement; evolution of meanings; laboratory experiment

摘要

We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap-talk refinement, neologism-proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is neologism-proof is played more often; senders deviate from an equilibrium in a way that can be predicted by the credibility of the neologism; and receivers' behavior indicates that they understand senders' deviating incentives. Our second set of treatments evaluates neologism-proofness from an evolutionary perspective in the absence of a common language. We find that the proportion of observations in which the meaning of a neologism evolves to disrupt a prevailing fully revealing equilibrium is lower when the equilibrium is neologism-proof. Our findings shed light on the capabilities and limitations of the refinement concept in predicting laboratory behavior under different language environments.