Protection for sale in a developing country: Democracy vs. dictatorship

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mitra, D; Thomakos, DD; Ulubasoglu, MA
• 署名单位: Syracuse University; National Bureau of Economic Research; State University System of Florida; Florida International University; Deakin University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/003465302320259493
• 发表日期: 2002-08
• 页码: 497-508
• 关键词: endogenous protection

摘要

For a genuine small open economy that has experienced both dictatorship and democracy, we find support for the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman (1994) Protection for Sale model. In contrast to previous studies, we use various protection measures (including tariffs, the direct measure of the theoretical model) and perform both single-year and panel regressions. Using Turkish industry-level data, the government's weight on welfare is estimated to be much larger than that on contributions. More importantly, we find that this weight is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship.