COMPLEMENTARITY AND CUSTOM IN WAGE CONTRACT VIOLATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Earle, John S.; Peter, Klara Sabirianova
• 署名单位: Central European University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest.91.4.832
• 发表日期: 2009-11
• 页码: 832-849
• 关键词: arrears

摘要

We present and estimate a model with strategic complementarities in firms' choices of on-time or delayed wage payment. Linked employer-employee panel data from Russia facilitate identification of the endogenous interactions through fixed effects for firms, workers, and local labor markets, and instrumental variables based on policy interventions. The estimated reaction function displays strongly positive neighborhood effects, and the estimated feedback loops-worker quits, effort, strikes, and legal penalties-imply that costs of wage delays are attenuated by neighborhood arrears. We also study a nonlinear case with two stable symmetric equilibria: a punctual payment and a late payment equilibrium.