Upgrades, tradeins, and buybacks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, D; Tirole, J
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Universite PSL; Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/2555887
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 235-258
• 关键词: durable-goods monopolists; planned obsolescence; incomplete information; PRODUCTS

摘要

We study monopoly pricing of overlapping generations of a durable good. We consider two sorts of goods: those with an active secondhand market and anonymous consumers, such as textbooks, and those with no secondhand market and consumers who can prove that they purchased the old good to qualify for a discount on the new one, such as software. In the first case we show that the monopolist may choose to either produce or repurchase the old good once the new one becomes available, In the latter case we determine when the monopolist chooses to offer upgrade discounts.