Endogenous formation of joint ventures with efficiency gains

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yi, SS
• 署名单位: Sogang University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/2556107
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 610-631
• 关键词: raising rivals costs; horizontal merger; oligopoly; externalities; POWER

摘要

I study stable structures of efficiency-enhancing joint ventures among symmetric firms. Efficiency gains that accrue to a joint venture are assumed to increase with its size. The socially efficient industrywide joint venture is the stable outcome when membership of a joint venture is open to outside firms but typically not when membership can be restricted Members of a large joint venture want to restrict membership for strategic reasons-e.g., in order to keep rival firms' costs high. Side payments among firms do not eliminate the strategic incentives of members of a large joint venture to limit membership.