Standard auctions with identity-dependent externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Das Varma, G
• 署名单位: Duke University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/3087481
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 689-708
• 关键词: Efficiency; MODEL

摘要

I analyze equilibrium bidding behavior in the open ascending-bid auction with identity-dependent externalities. With reciprocal externalities, the allocation is determined by bidders' consumption values alone. With large nonreciprocal externalities, the open auction generates higher expected revenue compared to standard sealed-bid auctions. The progress of the open auction reveals more information about the identity of the potential winner, allowing active bidders greater opportunity to avoid incurring payoff-reducing externalities. The associated option value to staying active up until a relatively high price translates into higher expected revenue. Multiple bidders may sequentially quit at the same price, and relative to sealed-bid auctions, bidders experience less ex post regret.