LOCAL ELECTORAL INCENTIVES AND DECENTRALIZED PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Janvry, Alain; Finan, Frederico; Sadoulet, Elisabeth
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00182
• 发表日期: 2012-08
• 页码: 672-685
• 关键词: accountability; politicians; GOVERNMENT; transfers; audits

摘要

This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36% larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First-term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to be reelected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes.