CAN OBSERVERS PREDICT TRUSTWORTHINESS?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Belot, Michele; Bhaskar, V.; van de Ven, Jeroen
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of London; University College London; University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00146
• 发表日期: 2012-02
• 页码: 246-259
• 关键词: cooperation; deception; EVOLUTION; JUDGMENT; promises; BEHAVIOR; catch

摘要

We investigate whether experimental subjects can predict behavior in a prisoner's dilemma played on a TV show. Subjects report probabilistic beliefs that a player cooperates, before and after the players communicate. Subjects correctly predict that women and players who make a voluntary promise are more likely to cooperate. They are able to distinguish truth from lies when a player is asked about her intentions by the host. Subjects are to some extent able to predict behavior; their beliefs are 7 percentage points higher for cooperators than for defectors. We also study their Bayesian updating. Beliefs do not satisfy the martingale property and display mean reversion.