Market-share contracts as facilitating practices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Inderst, Roman; Shaffer, Greg
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Rochester; University of East Anglia; Imperial College London
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00118.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 709-729
• 关键词: vertical control; naked exclusion

摘要

This article investigates how the use of contracts that condition discounts on the share a supplier receives of a retailer's total purchases (market-share contracts) may affect market outcomes. The case of a dominant supplier that distributes its product through retailers that also sell substitute products is considered. It is found that when the supplier's contracts can only depend on how much a retailer purchases of its product (own-supplier contracts), intra- and interbrand competition cannot simultaneously be dampened. However, competition on all goods can simultaneously be dampened when market-share contracts are feasible. Compared to own-supplier contracts, the use of market-share contracts increases the dominant supplier's profit and, if demand is linear, lowers consumer surplus and welfare.