Information and delay in an agency model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Drugov, Mikhail
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00113.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 598-615
• 关键词: correlated information; adverse selection; RENEGOTIATION; monopolist; CONTRACTS; DESIGN

摘要

This article studies how delay in contracting depends on an exogenous signal. The agent whose cost is his private information may produce in the first period or be delayed until the second period. A signal about the cost of the agent is available between the two periods. The quality of the good can vary; in the benchmark case of no signal, the principal offers the standard Baron-Myerson contract and there is no delay. Delay is determined by the considerations at the margin and may increase or decrease with a better signal. The value of information can be negative, as a better signal may aggravate the principal's commitment problem. A better signal may also increase the agent's rent and decrease social welfare.