Transparency and incentives among peers
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Winter, Eyal
署名单位：
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
DOI：
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00109.x
发表日期：
2010
页码：
504-523
关键词：
摘要：
This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing incentives. Using directed graphs to represent peer information, we show that under complementarity the cost of providing incentives is decreasing with the level of transparency within the organization. We also investigate the role of the architecture of the information in boosting incentives. In arguing that substitution impedes the benefits of transparency, we will compare function-based teams with process-based teams, showing that the latter are more effective in providing incentives.
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