Competition for scarce resources

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eso, Peter; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Mannheim; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 524-548
• 关键词: Auctions; capacity; duopoly

摘要

We model a downstream industry where firms compete to buy capacity in an upstream market which allocates capacity efficiently. Although downstream firms have symmetric production technologies, we show that industry structure is symmetric only if capacity is sufficiently scarce. Otherwise it is asymmetric, with one large, fat, capacity-hoarding firm and a fringe of smaller, lean, capacity-constrained firms. As demand varies, the industry switches between symmetric and asymmetric phases, generating predictions for firm size and costs across the business cycle. Surprisingly, increasing available capacity can cause a reduction in output and consumer surplus by resulting in such a switch.