Trigger happy or gun shy? Dissolving common-value partnerships with Texas shootouts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brooks, Richard R. W.; Landeo, Claudia M.; Spier, Kathryn E.
• 署名单位: Yale University; University of Alberta; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00115.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 649-673
• 关键词: ultimatum games; dissolution

摘要

The operating agreements of many business ventures include clauses to facilitate the exit of joint owners. In so-called Texas Shootouts, one owner names a single buy-sell price and the other owner is compelled to either buy or sell shares at that named price. Despite their prevalence in real-world contracts, Texas Shootouts are rarely triggered. In our theoretical framework, sole ownership is more efficient than joint ownership. Negotiations are frustrated, however, by the presence of asymmetric information. In equilibrium, owners eschew buy-sell offers in favor of simple offers to buy or to sell shares and bargaining failures arise. Experimental data support these findings.