RESOURCE EXTRACTION CONTRACTS UNDER THREAT OF EXPROPRIATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stroebel, Johannes; van Benthem, Arthur
• 署名单位: New York University; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00333
• 发表日期: 2013-12
• 页码: 1622-1639
• 关键词: risk; INVESTMENT; determinants; price

摘要

We use fiscal data on 2,468 oil extraction agreements in 38 countries to study tax contracts between resource-rich countries and independent oil companies. We analyze why expropriations occur and what determines the degree of oil price exposure of host countries. With asymmetric information about a country's expropriation cost, even optimal contracts feature expropriations. Near linearity in the oil price of real-world hydrocarbon contracts also helps to explain expropriations. We show theoretically and verify empirically that oil price insurance provided by tax contracts is increasing in a country's cost of expropriation and decreasing in its production expertise. The timing of actual expropriations is consistent with our model.