STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING WITH INFORMATION AND EXTRACTION EXTERNALITIES: A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF THE MULTISTAGE INVESTMENT TIMING GAME IN OFFSHORE PETROLEUM PRODUCTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lin, C. -Y. Cynthia
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00319
• 发表日期: 2013-12
• 页码: 1601-1621
• 关键词: common pool; OIL; EFFICIENCY

摘要

When individual petroleum-producing firms make their exploration and development investment timing decisions, positive information externalities and negative extraction externalities may lead them to interact strategically with their neighbors. This paper examines whether these inefficient strategic interactions take place by estimating a structural econometric model of the firms' multi-stage investment timing game. Results show that firms interact strategically on small tracts but not on large tracts. For small tracts, having a neighboring tract explored reduces real profits by about $26 million, while having a neighboring tract developed raises real profits by about $3.5 million.