Ad valorem platform fees, indirect taxes, and efficient price discrimination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wang, Zhu; Wright, Julian
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12183
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 467-484
• 关键词: imperfect competition; unit taxes

摘要

This article explains why platforms such as Amazon and Visa rely predominantly on ad valorem fees, fees which increase proportionally with transaction prices. It also provides a new explanation for why ad valorem sales taxes are more desirable than specific taxes. The theory rests on the ability of ad valorem fees and taxes to achieve efficient price discrimination, given that the value of a transaction to buyers tends to vary proportionally with the cost of the good traded.