Costly search with adverse selection: solicitation curse versus acceleration blessing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, Kyungmin; Pease, Marilyn
• 署名单位: University of Miami; University of Iowa
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12185
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 526-553
• 关键词: durable goods markets; asymmetric information; interdependent values; trading dynamics; labor-market; job search; equilibrium; QUALITY; sales; duration

摘要

We analyze a dynamic trading model of adverse selection where a seller can increase the frequency of strategic price quotes. A low-quality seller benefits more from trade and, therefore, searches more intensively than a high-quality seller. This makes a seller's contact carry negative information but a seller's availability become a stronger indicator of high quality. In the stationary environment, the two effects exactly offset each other, and reducing search costs is weakly beneficial to the seller. In the nonstationary environment, the relative strengths of the two effects vary over time, and reducing search costs can be detrimental to the seller.