PRICING REGULATION AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION ON THE MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ericson, Keith M. Marzilli; Starc, Amanda
• 署名单位: Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00514
• 发表日期: 2015-07
• 页码: 667-682
• 关键词: medicare part d; adverse selection; plan choice; MARKETS; REFORM; welfare; coverage; medigap; inertia; demand

摘要

We analyze insurance-pricing regulation under imperfect competition on the Massachusetts health insurance exchange. Differential markups lead to price variation apart from cost variation. Coarse insurer pricing strategies identify consumer demand. Younger consumers are twice as price sensitive as older consumers. Older consumers thus face higher markups over costs. Modified community rating links prices for consumers differing in both costs and preferences, and changes the marginal consumer firms face. Stricter regulations transfer resources from low-cost to high-cost consumers, reduce firm profits, and increase overall consumer surplus.