The bidder exclusion effect

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coey, Dominic; Larsen, Bradley; Sweeney, Kane
• 署名单位: Facebook Inc; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Uber Technologies, Inc.
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12263
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 93-120
• 关键词: optimal reserve price; ascending auctions; 1st-price auctions; identification; INFORMATION; inference; mergers; bounds; entry; distributions

摘要

We introduce a new, simple-to-compute test of independence of valuations and the number of bidders for ascending button auctions with symmetric, conditionally independent private values. The test involves estimating the expected revenue drop from excluding a bidder at random, which can be computed as a scaled sample average of a difference of order statistics. This object also provides a bound on counterfactual revenue changes from optimal reserve pricing or bidder mergers. We illustrate the approach using data from timber auctions, where we find some evidence that bidder valuations and the number of participants are not independent.