The optimal assortativity of teams inside the firm

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kambhampati, Ashwin; Segura-Rodriguez, Carlos
• 署名单位: United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; United States Naval Academy
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12419
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 484-515
• 关键词: limited-liability; moral hazard; incentives; authority; CONTRACTS; DESIGN; RISK

摘要

How does a profit-maximizing manager form teams and compensate workers when workers have private information about their productivity and exert hidden effort once in a team? We study a team production model in which positive assortative matching is both efficient and profit-maximizing under pure adverse selection and pure moral hazard. We show that the interaction of adverse selection and moral hazard can lead to nonassortative matching if complementarities are sufficiently weak. When this is the case, the manager may prefer to delegate matching, allowing workers to sort themselves into teams.