Better monitoring …Worse outcome?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhu, John Y.
• 署名单位: University of Kansas
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12484
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 550-572
• 关键词: Moral hazard; INFORMATION; EFFICIENCY; implicit; PRIVATE; ECONOMICS; CONTRACTS; models; games

摘要

New technologies allow firms to collect more information about worker performance than ever before. How will this extra information-much of which is non-contractible and is used at the firm's discretion-impact incentives? I highlight a better monitoring/worse outcome channel that speaks to these concerns. Some improvements to monitoring tempt the firm to punish excessively. Workers then demand contracts with a small punishment threat. Without a serious punishment threat, effort and surplus decline. I characterize what kinds of improvements to monitoring lead to a worse outcome and explore how technologies can be designed to mitigate the better monitoring/worse outcome effect.