Vote Buying or (Political) Business (Cycles) as Usual?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aidt, Toke; Asatryan, Zareh; Badalyan, Lusine; Heinemann, Friedrich
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Justus Liebig University Giessen; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00820
• 发表日期: 2020-07
• 页码: 409-425
• 关键词: central bank independence; budget cycles; consumption response; CORRUPTION; credibility; DEMOCRACY; debt

摘要

We report robust evidence of a new short-run monetary election cycle: the monthly growth rate of the money supply (M1) around elections is higher than in other months in a sample of low- and middle-income countries. We hypothesize this is related to systemic vote buying. Consistent with this, we find no cycle in authoritarian countries and countries with strong political institutions and a pronounced cycle in elections where international election monitors reported vote buying or in close elections. Using survey data on daily consumer expenditures, we show that within-household consumption of food increases in the days before elections.