The Role of Career and Wage Incentives in Labor Productivity: Evidence from a Two-Stage Field Experiment in Malawi

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, Hyuncheol Bryant; Kim, Seonghoon; Kim, Thomas T.
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Cornell University; Singapore Management University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00854
• 发表日期: 2020-12
• 页码: 839-851
• 关键词: performance pay; gift exchange; internship; work

摘要

We study how career and wage incentives affect labor productivity through self-selection and incentive effect channels using a two-stage field experiment in Malawi. First, recent secondary school graduates were hired with either career or wage incentives. After employment, half of the workers with career incentives randomly received wage incentives, and half of the workers with wage incentives randomly received career incentives. Career incentives attract higher-performing workers than wage incentives do, but they do not increase productivity conditional on selection. Wage incentives increase productivity for those recruited through career incentives. Observable characteristics are limited in explaining selection effects of entry-level workers.