How Do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Slemrod, Joel; Rehman, Obeid Ur; Waseem, Mazhar
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Toronto Metropolitan University; University of Manchester
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00929
• 发表日期: 2022-01
• 页码: 116-132
• 关键词: tax compliance; field; ECONOMICS; audit; ENFORCEMENT; evasion; FIRMS

摘要

We examine two Pakistani programs to see if the public disclosure of tax information and social recognition of top taxpayers promotes tax compliance. Pakistan began revealing income tax paid by all taxpayers in 2012. Simultaneously, another program began recognizing and rewarding the top 100 tax- paying corporations, partnerships, self-employed individuals, and wage earners. We find that the public disclosure caused an increase of 9 log points and the social recognition program 17 log points in the tax payments of agents exposed to the program. Our results suggest that such programs can be important policy levers to mobilize additional resources.