Fight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van Leeuwen, Boris; Offerman, Theo; van de Ven, Jeroen
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; University of Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_00961
• 发表日期: 2022-03
• 页码: 217-231
• 关键词: continuous-time; auctions; PRIVATE; common; attrition; rules; game; WAR

摘要

We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a deterrence value on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place, with weaker players fleeing before others fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for the key theoretical predictions and document suboptimal predatory fighting.