STRATEGIC CITATION: A REASSESSMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kuhn, Jeffrey; Younge, Kenneth; Marco, Alan
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01051
• 发表日期: 2023-03
• 页码: 458-466
• 关键词: patent citations

摘要

The United States patent system is unique in that it requires applicants to cite documents they know to be relevant to the examination of their patent applications. Lampe (2012) presents evidence that applicants strategically withhold 21%-33% of relevant citations from patent examiners, suggesting that many patents are fraudulently obtained. We challenge this view. We first show that Lampe's empirical design is inconsistent with both legal standards and standard operating procedures, including how courts identify strategic withholding. We then compile comprehensive data to reassess the empirical basis for Lampe's main claim. We find no evidence that applicants withhold citations.