Skill Versus Voice in Local Development

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casey, Katherine; Glennerster, Rachel; Miguel, Edward; Voors, Maarten
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Wageningen University & Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01082
• 发表日期: 2023-03
• 页码: 311-326
• 关键词: financial incentives; field experiment; politicians; bureaucrats; CONFLICT

摘要

Where the state is weak, traditional authorities control the local provision of public goods. These leaders come from an older, less educated generation and often rule in an authoritarian and exclusionary fashion. This means the skills of community members may not be leveraged in policymaking. We experimentally evaluate two solutions to this problem in Sierra Leone: one encourages delegation to higher-skill individuals, and a second fosters broader inclusion in decision making. In a real-world infrastructure grants competition, a public nudge to delegate led to better outcomes than the default of chiefly control, whereas attempts to boost participation were largely ineffective.