Fiscal Incentives for Conflict: Evidence from India's Red Corridor

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shapiro, Jacob N. N.; Eynde, Oliver Vanden
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01039
• 发表日期: 2023-01
• 页码: 217-225
• 关键词: violence

摘要

Can tax regimes shape the incentives to engage in armed conflict? Indian mining royalties benefit the states but are set by the central government. India's Maoist belt is mineral rich, and states are responsible for counterinsurgency operations. We exploit the introduction of a 10% ad valorem tax on iron ore that increased royalty collections of the affected states by a factor of 10. We find that the royalty hike was followed by a significant intensification of violence in districts with important iron ore deposits. The royalty increase was also followed by an increase in illegal mining activity in iron mines.