Skeptical Employers: Experimental Evidence on Biased Beliefs Constraining Firm Growth

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Caria, Stefano A.; Falco, Paolo
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; University of Copenhagen
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01219
• 发表日期: 2024-09
• 页码: 1352-1368
• 关键词: real effort; management-practices; trust; trustworthiness; expectations; RECIPROCITY; ECONOMICS; education; fairness; aversion

摘要

Does low trust in workers discourage firms from hiring? We conduct an experiment in Ghana with real entrepreneurs who have the option to hire anonymous workers for a trivial but tedious task. Shirking attracts no penalty and completion of the task is an indicator of trustworthiness. We elicit employers' expectations and study how they change with random signals of workers' previous behavior. We find that employers underestimate workers' trustworthiness, which reduces hiring and profits. Negative signals lower employers' expectations, while positive signals do not affect them. This asymmetry can help to sustain an equilibrium with limited experimentation and biased beliefs.